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The paper recognizes that expectations and the process of their for-
mation are subject to standard decision making and are determined as a
part of equilibrium. Accordingly, the paper presents a basic framework in
which the form of expectation formation is a choice variable. At any point
in time rational economic agents decide on the basis of the level of utility
what expectation formation technology to use and as a consequence what
expectations to hold. As economic decisions are conditioned on expecta-
tions holding proper or rational expectations eliminates the possibility of
ex ante ineﬃciencies. The choice of expectation formation technology is
not trivial as the paper assumes that information gathering and processing
are costly. Consequently, economic agents must make informed decisions
with the regard to the quality of expectation formation technologies they
wish to use. The paper shows that agents￿ optimization over expectations
not only adds on to realism, but also can carry non trivial implications
for the behavior of macroeconomic variables. Speci￿cally, the paper illus-
trates that endogenous expectation revisions can be a source of perma-
nent oscillations in aggregate demand and can prevent an economy from
settling into a steady state. In addition, the paper quanti￿es intangible
notions such as overheating, overborrowing, and output gap. Finally, the
paper shows that active policy measures can limit ineﬃciencies resulting
from output ￿uctuations.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D84, E32.
Key Words: Business Cycles, Expectation Formation, Costly Informa-
tion Acquisition.
1 Introduction
Short run oscillatory movements in macroeconomic variables are a distinctive
characteristic of modern economies. Accordingly, the phenomenon has been cen-
tral to macroeconomic analysis. The paper contributes to the extensive existing
literature and presents a complementary rationalization for the occurrence of
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1recession and expansions. The paper oﬀers a novel approach. It builds on a
recent contribution of Brock and Hommes [7] and argues that expectations can
be a key determinant of short run macroeconomic performance. Speci￿cally, it
shows, in a general equilibrium framework, that rational selection of diﬀerent
expectation formation technologies can be a source of endogenous ￿uctuations
in aggregate demand.
The stark coexistence of recessions and expansions has attracted a consid-
erable attention from the profession. Historically economists have attempted
to account for business cycles by interpreting them as combinations of deter-
ministic cycles of diﬀerent lengths. However, eﬀorts to represent ￿uctuations in
aggregate output as the outcome of regular Kitchin (3-year), Juglar (10-year),
Kuznets (20-year), and Kondratiev (50-year) cycles have been abandoned in
favor of approaches that emphasize either the importance of stochastic distur-
bances, or the interaction of expectations and multiple equilibria, or assign the
key responsibility to intrinsic nonlinearities of macroeconomic systems.
The real business cycle literature based on stochastic dynamic equilibrium
models and spurred by the initial contribution of Kydland and Prescott [39]
de￿nes the main stream approach towards understanding short run ￿uctuation.
The approach relies on general equilibrium modelling and identi￿es exogenous
technology, taste or government purchases shocks as the driving forces of busi-
ness cycles. The approach has proven to be relatively successful in accounting
for qualitative and quantitative aspects of business cycles. This paper shares
with the main stream general equilibrium approach. However, the results its
presents add on to the existing literature. Speci￿cally, the paper shows that
cycles need not imply, even in the absence of nominal rigidities, movements in
the potential level of output.
The second approach, most notable examples being Diamond [15], Kiyotaki
[29], exploits the fact that a priori economic systems need not have unique
equilibria and, therefore, downturns and upswings in economic activity can be
an outcome of movements between diﬀerent equilibria. The approach despite
its theoretical appeal requires several tacit assumptions with the need for the
existence of exogenous coordinating device being a key shortcoming. Moreover,
voluntary coordination by rational and high payoﬀ seeking economic agents on
an inferior equilibrium implies that ￿uctuations and resulting welfare losses are
largely self-in￿icted and most importantly totally avoidable.
The contributions in the third group, Grandmont [22], Aghion, Banerjee
and Piketty [2], Matsuyama [32], [33] note that the cyclicality in macroeco-
nomic variables can be an inherent property of macroeconomic systems and
￿uctuations can in fact be endogenous. This paper falls into this ￿nal category,
i.e., it argues that high frequency dynamics in macroeconomic variables can be
endogenous. However, unlike other contributions it illustrates that equilibrium
actions of rational and high payoﬀ seeking economic agents rather than intrin-
sic properties of the underlying equilibrium equations can induce ￿uctuations
in systems that are otherwise stable.
The paper develops a general equilibrium model based on the OLG model of
Diamond [14] and the monopolistic competition model of Blanchard and Kiy-
2otaki [5]. The presence of monopolistic competition allows the composition of
aggregate demand aside from fundamentals: preferences, technology, and re-
sources aﬀect aggregate output. The composition of aggregate demand depends
amongst other factors on the perception of the future. In particular, an expecta-
tion of high income ￿ows in the future results, due to intertemporal smoothing,
in low savings today. Low savings imply high consumption, which leads to high
output. Conversely, an expectation of low income streams in the future provides
an incentive to increase savings. Increased savings curtail consumption and re-
sult in low output. Consequently, changes in expectations lead to ￿uctuations
in aggregate output. Expectations, however, are not assumed to be exogenous.
Quite the contrary expectations and foremost the process of their formation are
endogenized and any changes in expectations constitute an equilibrium outcome.
The paper follows the methodology of Brock and Hommes [7] and endoge-
nizes expectation formation in an environment in which it is costly to collect
and process information. Speci￿cally, the paper assumes that economic agents
need to expend resources if they wish to obtain reliable assessments of the fu-
ture values of macroeconomic variables. In particular, naive assessments, based
on past realizations and past experience, are assumed to be costless. On the
other hand perfect foresight assessment can be obtained only at a cost. Natu-
rally, expectations based on naive assessments allow economic agents to save on
the information gathering and processing costs, but lead to mistakes along the
intertemporal margin and result in a loss in terms of utility as the consump-
tion pro￿le is not smoothened out optimally. Similarly, expectations formed
on the basis of reliable assessments eliminate the possibility of errors along the
intertemporal margin and do not impose direct losses in terms of utility, but
c a nb ef o r m e dp r o v i d e dt h a tt h ep r o p e ri n f o r m a t i o ng a t h e r i n ga n dp r o c e s s i n g
costs have been accrued. Naturally, rational agents need to balance the two
eﬀects in equilibrium and make an informed decision with regard to the type of
expectations they wish to hold.
The paper shows that the desire of economic agents to economize on infor-
mation gathering and processing costs can prevent an economy from settling
into a steady state. The paper develops a model in which the economy follows
and unstable dynamic equation when all economic agents choose to form expec-
tations in an adaptive manner and follows a dynamic equation that settles into
a rest point if economic agents choose to form expectations in a rational (perfect
foresight) manner. Therefore, adaptive or naive learning, expectations based on
past experience, puts the economy on explosive trajectories and ultimately must
result in signi￿cant errors along the intertemporal margin and a substantial loss
in terms of utility. Economic agents in the face of signi￿cant errors along the
intertemporal margin expend resources and shift toward rational assessments of
the future. This puts the economy on a convergent path. However, the econ-
omy never converges towards a steady state. Convergence implies by de￿nition
that future outcomes resemble current outcomes, therefore, were convergence
to occur passive or adaptive learning would lead to minuscule errors along the
intertemporal margin. Consequently economic agents would ￿nd it optimal to
switch toward adaptive learning. This, however, would lead to divergence and
3the cycle would repeat itself resulting in permanent oscillations even in the
absence of exogenous innovations. Oscillations are not a consequence of mathe-
matical properties of underlying dynamic equilibrium equations. The path that
the economy follows is chosen in equilibrium and a priori the economy need not
follow an oscillatory path.
Economic theory either perceives downturns in economic activity as shifts
in the potential level of output or as temporary deviations from the underlying
level of potential level of output. This paper falls into the latter category and
illustrates that endogenous revisions of expectations cause output to ￿uctuate
around the trend. Speci￿cally, the paper shows that overly optimistic expecta-
tions lead to high consumption and to high output and pessimistic expectations
cause consumption to be low and output to fall below the potential level of
output. Moreover, the paper illustrates that a boom caused by consumer con-
￿dence and consumer spending can endogenously end with a drastic revision of
expectations and a cut in the level of consumption. The paper, thus, rationalizes
consumption shocks thought to be at the root of the 1990/91, see Blanchard [4],
and 2001 recessions. Moreover, the paper formalizes and gives precise meaning
and clear interpretation to intangible notions such as: overheating, output gap,
overborrowing, or irrational spending sprees etc. Consequently, the paper shows
that consumer behavior can depart from optimal ￿rst best spending plans and
that the deviations can become costly ex post and can lead to endogenous revi-
sions of expectation. Finally, the paper provides a justi￿cation for the usage of
countercyclical policy measures allowing for smoothing out deviations from the
trend.
The paper resembles most closely the recent contribution by Brock and
Hommes [7] who study the dynamics of a cobweb model with costly forma-
tion of expectations, showing that agents may ￿nd it optimal to switch between
diﬀerent expectation formation technologies if it is costly to collect data. This
paper, contrary to Brock and Hommes, allows agents to choose the optimal
expectation formation technology in the rational fashion based on the level of
utility that it gives, whereas in Brock and Hommes [7] agents choose expectation
f o r m a t i o nt e c h n o l o g i e sb a s e do nt h e i rp a s tp e r f o r m a n c e .M o r e o v e r ,i nt h i ss e t -
ting we allow agents to switch expectation formation technologies at any point
in time and all agents do indeed use the optimal one. In Brock and Hommes[7],
on the other hand, some agents are arti￿cially constrained to use suboptimal
expectation formation technologies.
Ramey and Evans [18] also present a model that is similar to the one in
this paper. Their model allows to trade between accuracy an income, a feature
exploited in this paper, However, the dynamics in their model are driven by
changing environment. In this paper the changes of environment are endoge-
nous, not triggered by exogenous movements in states of the world, and are
solely due to changes in the behavior of economic agents.
Blanchard [6] studies a model in which agents learn about the economy.
He ￿nds that learning need not lead to a full revelation of the fundamentals
of the economy and that in the limit agents may not know the correct model
of the economy. This paper presents a complementary result. It is shown
4that learning from past experience allows to fully identify the structure of the
economy. However, the paper illustrates that the structure of the economy is
itself aﬀected by the learning process and hence any inferences based on past
data if used in decision making process aﬀect the structure of the economy.
In other words, the paper presents an example of the Lucas Critique [31]i n
the context learning and expectation formation aﬀecting the structure of the
economy. Furthermore, it is shown that learning may under some parameter
values cause instability in systems that otherwise would tend to a steady state
equilibrium a point initially brought by Evans [16], Marcet and Sargent [34] in
a partial equilibrium context.
The recent contribution of Reis [41] shares many of the ￿ndings of this paper.
Speci￿cally, the paper, as in Reis [41], shows that informational costs imply
that consumption pro￿les depart from the optimal ￿rst best. However, Reis￿s
analysis in a partial equilibrium one and focuses on consumer behavior in the
context exogenously changing environment and costly information acquisition.
This paper is cast in a general equilibrium framework and shows that updates
of consumption plans can lead to endogenous changes in the environment and
to endogenous oscillations.
The paper is organized in six sections. Section (2) outlines the underlying
model. Section (3) determines the equilibrium. Section (4) endogenizes the
process of expectation formation and presents sample dynamics. Section (5)
focuses on policy considerations. Finally, section (6) concludes.
2M o d e l
There are three main components of the model. The intertemporal aspects
are captured in the framework of the Diamond [14] OLG model. In addition,
Blanchard and Kiyotaki [5] imperfect competition framework allows shifts in
the composition of aggregate demand to in￿uence contemporaneous variables.
Finally, Brock and Hommes [7] approach is used to endogenize expectation
formation. The model is fully analytically tractable.
2.1 Agents
There are a continuum of measure one of agents born each period. Each agent
lives for two periods and is endowed with a unit of labor in the ￿rst period of
her life. An agent born at time t values consumption in the ￿rst period of her
life, when she is young, and consumption in the second period of her lifer, when
she is old. The preferences of an agent born at time t are represented by the
following utility function
U (c1,t,c 2,t+1)=l o g( c1,t)+l o g( c2,t+1). (1)
The logarithmic utility simpli￿es the intertemporal problem immensely and is
chosen for analytic convenience.
52.2 Goods
There are two classes of ￿nal goods in this economy and a class of intermediate
goods. There is a single ￿nal consumption good. There are a continuum of
measure one of intermediate goods, which are used as inputs in the production
process of the ￿nal consumption good. In addition, there is physical capital,
which plays both the role of an investment good, used as a form of saving, and
of a productive input.
2.3 Production
The ￿nal consumption good is produced from intermediate goods via the fol-









where ci,t denotes the input of the intermediate good i. The market for the
consumption good is perfectly competitive.





where ki,t denotes the amount of capital and li,t denotes the amount of labor
used in the process of production of good i. The markets for the intermediate









where Dt denotes the level of demand for the ￿nal consumption good and pi
t
and pt d e n o t et h ep r i c eo ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di and the consumption good,
respectively.




out of labor, where lk
t denotes the amount of labor used in the production of
physical capital. In addition, it is assumed that the market for physical capital
is perfectly competitive.1
The input output matrix is presented in ￿gure (1.)
2.4 Income
There are several sources of income in this economy. First of all, factors of
production receive rental fees. Secondly, imperfect competition in the inter-
mediate goods sectors allows pro￿ts to arise in equilibrium. It assumed that
1The fact that labor is the only input in the production of physical capital allows for a










Figure 1: Input-Output Matrix
pro￿ts that arise in equilibrium belong to the old. Moreover, it is assumed that
in equilibrium there is no trade in pro￿ts h a r e s .
The income of young agents comes from labor supply and is equal to the
wage income, given by,
y1,t = wt. (6)
The income of old agents comes from three sources. Recall that savings take
the form of physical capital. Therefore, old agents can sell the capital stock that
they own, the capital stock they acquired the period before net of depreciation.
In addition, they can rent out their capital and receive the return on it. Finally,
old agents receive equilibrium pro￿ts. The income of the old is given by,
y2,t =( 1− δ)pk
tkt + rtkt + πt, (7)
where pk
t denotes the equilibrium price of a unit of physical capital, δ the rate
of depreciation of physical capital, rt the rental costs, and πt denotes the equi-
librium pro￿ts.
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium involves several aspects. There are standard intratemporal
and intertemporal considerations of the consumer problem and the producer
problem. In addition, equilibrium comprises the process of selection expectation
formation technology.
73.1 Consumer Problem
Consumers live for two periods. Young agents face a standard intertemporal
choice problem, i.e., young agents must decide how to allocate their life time
earnings between the two periods. Therefore, they maximize their utility
U (c1,t,c 2,t+1)=l o g( c1,t)+l o g( c2,t+1)
s u b j e c tt ot h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t s
ptc1,t + st = y1,t
st = pk
tkt+1
pt+1c2,t+1 = rt+1kt+1 +( 1− δ)pk
t+1kt+1 + πt+1,
where pt, and pt+1 denote the prices of the consumption good in period t and
period t +1 , respectively, pk
t and pk
t+1 are the prices of physical capital in the
two periods, and st denotes the amount saved in period t. Physical capital is
t h eo n l yi n v e s t m e n tg o o dh e n c ei ne q u i l i b r i u mt h ea m o u n ts a v e dm u s tb ee q u a l
to the purchases of physical capital, i.e., it must be pk
tkt+1 = st.
The calculations pertaining to the intertemporal considerations in this model
are by far more demanding than those in the original Diamond model. There-
fore, in order to simplify the exposition, to avoid a discussion on potential corner
solutions, the rate of depreciation of physical capital is assumed to be one, i.e.,
f r o mn o wo ni ti sa s s u m e dt h a tδ =1 .The last assumption implies that physical
capital once purchased can only be rented out and cannot be resold.


























Let kt denote the capital stock available in period t (savings of the young in
period t − 1.) Moreover, let Dt denote the demand for the ￿nal consumption
good at time t and let Dk
t be the demand for the investment good, i.e., the
amount saved at time t. Finally, let βt b et h ef r a c t i o no fi n c o m es a v e da tt i m e
t.
The market for the investment good is perfectly competitive and the pro-
duction function for the investment good is linear hence the price of a unit of
physical capital is equal to the marginal cost, i.e., to the wage pk
t = wt. Recall
that the income of the young is equal to the wage and that the savings take
8the form of physical capital. Therefore, the level of investment, newly installed
capital, at time t is given by
kt+1 = βt. (10)
Moreover, the form of the production function implies that the level employment
in the investment good sector by lk
t is given by lk
t = βt. The market clearing
condition implies that the level of employment in the intermediate good sectors
is given by
lint
t =1− βt. (11)
The market for the ￿nal consumption good is perfectly competitive. The
production function is of a standard CES form. Therefore, the price of a unit











where pi denotes the price of intermediate good i. Markets for intermediate
goods are monopolistic. The demand for a given good is given by equation 4.
The price of intermediate good i, note assumption of a CES production function,











Monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods sectors together with
the assumption of the CES production function allow to establish that the level
of pro￿ts generated in the economy is given by
πt =( 1− γ)Dt, (14)
and the total wage bill in the intermediate goods sectors assumes the form
wtl
int
t =( 1− α)γDt, (15)
and the factor payment to physical capital can be expressed ad
rtkint
t = αγDt.( 16)
Note that in equilibrium the level of physical capital engagement in the interme-
diate goods sector kint
t is equal to the supply of capital kt, recall that only labor
is used in the process of production of the investment good (physical capital),
whereas the level of employment in the intermediate goods sectors lint
t is given
















9Finally, combining the above relationships it is possible to show that the









where φ =( 1− γ (1 − α)).
It is natural to de￿ne the level of output in this model as the sum of incomes
of young and old agents, i.e.,
GDPt = y1,t + y2,t.
The income of the young is simply equal to the wage, y1,t = wt,a n dt h ei n c o m e
of the old comes from two sources: earnings received from physical capital rental
and pro￿ts, i.e., y2,t = rtkt + πt. Moreover, the demand for the consumption
good comes from two sources: the old devote all of their wealth towards pur-
chases of the consumption good and the young devote a fraction 1−βt of their
income towards consumption, hence
Dt = y2,t +( 1− βt)y1,t. (20)





Finally, the level of output expressed in terms of the price of the consumption






for completeness recall that the employment in the intermediate goods sectors
equals lint
t =1− βt.
Equation (21) completes the description of the intratemporal equilibrium.
Moreover, the last equation illustrates that the aggregate output not only de-
pends on the supply side characteristics, i.e., the technology and the resources
available, the amount of physical capital kt, but also on the marginal propensity
to save βt. In other words, not only the supply side determines output, but also
the composition of aggregate demand in￿uences the aggregate output. The last
￿nding stems from fact that the sectors of intermediate goods are monopolisti-
cally competitive whereas the investment good sector is perfectly competitive.
Such a structure leads to the existence of aggregate demand externality, which
in turn in￿uences aggregate variables. Young agents by changing the amount
of income saved, aﬀect the demand for the consumption good. However, by
aﬀecting the demand they aﬀect pro￿ts in the intermediate goods sectors. A
change in the pro￿ts in the intermediate goods sectors aﬀects the income of the
old agents, which in turn aﬀects the demand for the consumption good, which
10again aﬀects the pro￿tability, and so on. This process continues and results in
an equilibrium change in the aggregate output.2
3.3 Intertemporal Allocation
The ultimate goal of this paper is to show that macroeconomic cycles can con-
stitute an equilibrium outcome. It is widely known, Grandmont [20], that the
Diamond OLG model, used as the benchmark in this paper, itself is capable of
generating endogenous cycles. Therefore, it is imperative to show that the exis-
tence of cycles in the model presented in the paper is due to expectation selection
rather than being due to the fact that the Diamond OLG model is a key build-
ing block of the model. Accordingly, the paper assumes ￿rst perfect foresight
and shows that the economy does not exhibit endogenous ￿uctuations and then
assumes that information gathering and processing are costly and solves for the
equilibrium allowing agents to select amongst diﬀerent expectation formation
technologies.





The equilibrium outcomes in period t not only depend on the values of macro-
economic variables in period t, but also depend on values of variables in period
t +1 . In particular, the amount saved at time t, as equation (9) indicates, de-
pends on xt+1. Therefore, the value of capital stock in period t +1 ,w h i c hi s
itself determined in period t, depends on the way economic agents form expec-
tations at time t regarding the value of xt+1. Thus, agents￿ expectations at time
t regarding period t +1in￿uence economic activity in period t.
Let Ωt be the information set of a young agent born at time. Her problem
given the information set Ωt is to maximize
U (c1,t,c 2,t+1)=l o g( c1,t)+Et(log(c2,t+1)|Ωt)
subject to her budget constraints. Under the assumption of perfect foresight
the information set Ωt contains the values of all current and future variables, in
particular, the information set at time t contains the value of xt+1,i . e . ,
xt+1 ∈ Ωt.
Therefore, young agents at time t are fully aware of the precise value of xt+1




(1 − xt+1). (22)
2The fact that the production functions in the ￿nal consumption good sector and the
investment good sector diﬀer additionally contributes this result.














The Evolution of GDP under Perfect Foresight
Figure 2: The Evolution of Ouptuput under Perfect Foresight.
Furthermore, equation (17) indicates that xt =2 ψkt,w h e r eψ =
1−γ
αγ . Iteration
by one period implies that xt+1 =2 ψkt+1. Thus, the level of investment at time





Therefore,∀t1,t 2 : kt1 = kt2. Naturally, under the assumption of perfect fore-
sight the level of investment and the level of physical capital are constant
and independent of time. Moreover, recall that in equilibrium the marginal
propensity to save equals to the level of investment equation (10.) Therefore, it
turns out that in equilibrium the average propensity to save is a constant, i.e.,
∀t1,t 2 : βt1 = βt2. Consequently aggregate output, as given by formula (21), is
constant. Figure (2) presents sample dynamics of output.
Clearly, the assumption of perfect foresight leads to a stable equilibrium in
which all variables are constant and, in particular, in which aggregate output
does not ￿uctuate. Therefore, should there any oscillations occur if the assump-
tion of perfect foresight is relaxed the oscillations will not be due to the fact
that the Diamond OLG model is used as the benchmark.
The assumption of perfect foresight leads to an uninteresting equilibrium
dynamics. The situation is diﬀerent if one allows for alternative expectation
formation technologies. Recall that xt+1 determines the amount saved by young
agents at time t. Therefore, economic agents must form expectations with the
regard to xt+1. In particular, if agents decide to expect xe
t+1 at time t then the
level of investment and, hence, the marginal propensity to save take the form








12Observe that the intratemporal problem is unaﬀected by the characteristics of
the expectation formation technology, therefore, the equilibrium level of output,







where βt is given by (24). Also recall that in equilibrium kt = βt−1.N o t et h a t
in this case output need not be constant. Any change in xe
t+1 l e a d st oam o v e
of βt and consequently aﬀects the level of output. Therefore, if in equilibrium
economic agents choose to modify their expectations the change will result in
an innovation in the level of output.
In summary expectations aﬀect aggregate activity because they aﬀect the
marginal propensity to save. Optimism leads economic agents to devote a
smaller fraction of their incomes toward savings and in turn to high output.
Conversely, pessimistic expectations cause economic agents to save a higher
fraction of their incomes, which leads to low demand for consumption good and
in turn to low output.
4 Optimal Expectation Formation
An ability to predict the future with certainty presents economic value as it al-
lows for optimal behavior along the intertemporal margin. However, normally,
economic agents do not have enough capacity to formulate correct point esti-
mates of future economic variables. In reality, economic decision making relies
only on imperfect, second best, assessments of future outcomes. Speci￿cally,
economic agents at any point in time decide which or what combination of fore-
casting tools to develop and to rely on. Similarly, economic agents decide what
information sets to base their decisions on. The mainstream of the literature
either assumes that information regarding future variables arrives exogenously
and economic agents use that information to improve their assessments of the
future, or it assumes that agents willing to sharpen their assessments of the
future need to purchase informative signals at some costs. This paper follows
the latter approach and assumes that economic agents incur a cost in the form
of utility when they attempt to enhance their estimation of the future.
4.1 Rational Selection of an Expectation Formation Tech-
nology
The intertemporal problem of an agent at time t involves an assessment of
xt+1. Therefore, a particular assessment leads to a particular behavior along
the intertemporal margin. The paper develops a framework in which agents are
allowed decide on the quality of assessments of relevant future variables. In other
words, the paper refrains from imposing any speci￿c expectations formation
technology. On the contrary, it treats the process of expectation formation as a
13part of equilibrium and allows agents to decide what expectations to hold with
regard to given variables.
Observe that there are no stochastic disturbances in the model. All out-
comes are purely deterministic. However, economic agents need not have the
ability or desire to discriminate between deterministic and stochastic dynamics.
Accordingly, it is assumed that economic agents treat observed values as being
realizations of some underling random variables. Speci￿cally, economic agents
consider realizations of xt as random draws from some distribution. The distri-
bution can be conditional on past realized values and can assumes an extreme
form of the delta (Dirac) function.
Recall that the level of utility of a representative agent can be expressed as












Note that under the assumption of logarithmic utility the real value of future
pro￿ts xt+1 =
πt+1
rt+1 i st h eo n l y ,e v e ni nt h ep r e s e n c eo fu n c e r t a i n t y ,f u t u r ev a r i -
able relevant for the determination of the level of savings. Naturally, apart from
xt+1 both future rental price of capital rt+1 and the future price of consump-
tion pt+1in￿uence the level of realized utility. However, beliefs pertaining to
variables pt+1 and rt+1 do not aﬀect the intertemporal problem . Therefore, the
paper focuses solely on expectation formation with respect to variable xt+1.
Let Ft
xt+1 be the prior distribution of xt+1 at time t. In addition, let Etxt+1
be the expected value of xt+1 at time t and let σ2
xt+1 be the corresponding vari-
ance. In the literature there are two mainstream approaches normally followed
in the context of decision making under uncertainty. Expected utility maximiza-
tion is the dominant one while certainty equivalence approach remains a tool
of convenience. This paper follows the latter approach, i.e., it is assumed that
economic agents treat random variables as if they were equal to their means.
This simpli￿cation allows for a complete analytic tractability of the model. The
results are qualitatively unchanged. However, with a certainty equivalence ap-
proach an important channel is absent. There is no precautionary saving motive,
which when present enriches the equilibrium dynamics.
At any point in time economic agents need an assessment of xt+1 to decide
on the level of savings. It is assumed that the prior Ft
xt+1 is available to economic
agents free of any costs. However, economic agents are not constrained to this
speci￿c piece information. In addition, each agent can purchase a signal of the




xt+1 with probability q
￿ Fxt+1 with probability 1 − q, (26)
where Fxt+1 denotes the prior distribution of variable xt+1.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
it is assumed that with a chance q t h es i g n a lr e v e a l st h et r u ev a l u eo ft h e
v a r i a b l ea n dw i t hac h a n c e1 − q the signal gives a random draw from the
14prior distribution, i.e., is completely uninformative. Naturally, the larger the
value of q the more informative a given signal is. The paper assumes that the
degree of informativeness of a given signal q is a choice variable. Agents are
free to choose how well informed they become. However, a given choice of q is
accompanied with a cost in terms of utility C
$
q2%
. The cost function satis￿es
standard properties
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Note that agents can choose to be fully informed. They select q to be equal
to one. However, if they do so they must pay the cost C (1). On the other hand,
agents can rely only on their priors, i.e., they can set q to be equal to zero and
save on information acquisition as C (0) = 0.
An agent who decides at time t to purchase a signal of quality qt receives a
signal ν and then forms the corresponding posterior distribution. Speci￿cally,
if she receives a signal νxt+1 for variable xt+1 then the corresponding posterior





In the following step the posterior distributions are used in the process of the
determination of optimal behavior.
Recall that under the assumption of perfect foresight the optimal level of





and is independent of the future consumption price pt+1 and the future rental
costs rt+1. Moreover, given the assumption of logarithmic utility the two vari-
ables remain irrelevant even in the case of uncertainty and expected utility
maximization approach. In order to preserve complete analytic tractability the
paper deals with uncertainty by assuming certainty equivalence behavior or
more precisely by assuming that economic agents treat future variables as if











This form of behavior implies that realized utility conditional on signal νxt+1 is
given by












+l o g (
rt+1
pt+1) − 2log(2).N o t et h a tt h e
level of realized utility depends both on the future price of consumption pt+1
and on future rental cost rt+1. Of course it also depends on the realized value
of xt+1. Clearly, as long as the true realized value diﬀers from the expected one







as the consumption pro￿le is not smoothened out optimally. Note that a priori
economic agents can avoid this cost by purchasing a perfectly informative signal.
15It is apparent that the realized utility depends on two factors. First of all,
it depends on the state of nature, i.e., the true values of xt+1,p t+1 and rt+1
and on νxt+1 a particular signal received for xt+1. However, when an agent
decides to purchase a signal she neither knows what signal she will receive
nor she knows the true state of nature. Nevertheless, she must decide on the
quality of a signal she wishes to receive before any uncertainty is resolved.
Observe that conditional on a given state of nature xt+1 the loss ε2 resulting
from insuﬃcient consumption smoothing is a function of a speci￿cs i g n a ld r a w n
νxt+1. Moreover, both the signal and the resulting loss are unknown ex ante.
Consequently economic agents must form expectations with the regard of the




be the conditional, also obtained by Bayes
rule, distribution function of a given value of a signal given that the state of
nature is xt+1. Then the "expected" level of realized utility, again performing
for analytic convenience certainty equivalence calculation, conditional on a given
state of nature xt+1 is given by











Observe that the level of realized utility depends on the true state of nature xt+1
and on the expected error resulting from suboptimal consumption smoothing.
Naturally, diﬀerent realizations of xt+1 will lead to diﬀerent levels of realized
utility. Unfortunately, the value of xt+1 is also ex ante unknown, therefore,
the unconditional "expected" realized utility can only be obtained by using the
underlying priors. A certainty equivalence evaluation leads to








where G(−) denotes the unconditional distribution of νxt+1 and the prior Fxt+1 is
used to determine Et (1 + xt+1)
2.
The speci￿c form of the distribution of signals (26) implies that the condi-
tional expected value of xt+1 c a nb ee x p r e s s e da s
E(xt+1|νxt+1)=qtνxt+1 +( 1− qt)Etxt+1 (29)





= qt (1 − qt)(νxt+1 − Etxt+1)
2 +( 1− qt)σ
2
xt+1. (30)
Therefore, the realized utility under the assumption of certainty equivalence
behavior before a speci￿c signal of quality qt is purchased is given by
U = At +l o g( Et (1 + xt+1)





Naturally, the more informative a given signal is the higher the "expected"
realized utility. Similarly, the larger the ex ante uncertainty the smaller the
"expected" realized utility. Recall that signals can be obtained only at some






Therefore, the ex ante level of utility net of information acquisition costs is given
by
U = At +l o g( Et (1 + xt+1)




Economic agents given their priors must decide on the quality of signals they
receive. Technically, economic agents must balance the loss in terms of utility
resulting from insuﬃcient consumption smoothing with the loss in terms of
utility resulting from information purchase, i.e., they select the quality qt so as
to the level of utility is the largest. The ￿rst order condition for an interior













The right hand side is monotone decreasing in q2
t. The left hand side depends
on the ratio of the life time expected income to its variability. The solution is
characterized by several intuitive features. First of all, the higher the underlying
uncertainty the larger the precision of signals purchased. Similarly, if the under-
lying uncertainty is low then only very uninformative signals are purchased and
expectations are backward looking. Moreover, the higher the expected value of
xt+1 the lower the precision of signals. This is due to the fact that with concave
utility a loss in terms of utility resulting from an error of a given magnitude
falls with the level of consumption. In other words, at low levels of consump-
tion a given level of disequilibrium along the intertemporal margin has a larger
impact in terms of utility than the same level of disequilibrium at a high level
of consumption. This property implies that at times when economic agents
expect favorable conditions in the future, i.e., when they save little, i.e., times
of expansions, they will also choose to be less informed. As a consequence the
property implies that economic agents tolerate a higher level of intertemporal
errors when they are optimistic about the future than they do when they are
pessimistic about the future. Naturally, this implies that recessions should be
on average shorter than expansions.
In this section the paper adheres to the assumption that all agents use the
same priors. The decision making process of consumers starts with the decision
on the quality of signals. Given the prior agents choose the quality according
to the optimality condition (31). Then a speci￿c signal is generated for each
consumer. Naturally, not all consumers receive the same signal. Let νi be the
signal for xt+1 received by consumer i. Recall that consumer i uses the signal
to form the posterior distribution F
$
xt+1|νi%
and then chooses the optimal
l e v e lo fi n v e s t m e n ti np h y s i c a lc a p i t a l .T h el e v e lo fi n v e s t m e n tc a nb eo b t a i n e d









qtνi +( 1− qt)Etxt+1
%%
.
Note that the level of investment chosen by a speci￿c agent is dependent on
the speci￿c signal she obtained. However, the aggregate level of investment
17remains deterministic, as the law of large numbers allows to establish
)
νidi =
















Moreover, in equilibrium the level of investment is proportional to the true
value3 of xt+1, i.e., xt+1 =2 ψkt+1. Therefore, the equilibrium evolution of














Recall that all agents receive the same amount of income in the ￿rst period of
their lives. Therefore, even though they save diﬀerent fractions of their incomes,
dependent on speci￿c signals they draw, the average propensity to save in the
aggregate remains constant and is equal to the level of investment in physical
capital, i.e., βt = kt+1. Therefore, the level of output in terms of the price of






Clearly, the level of output changes when βt changes. The latter may change for
either a change in the expected value of xt+1 or for a change in the precision of
signals qt. Naturally, whenever economic agents are ex ante optimistic about the
future the smaller the fraction of income saved and the larger the equilibrium
output. Similarly, a change in the informativeness of signals triggers a change
in the level of savings and in the level of output. However, changes if they do
happen are a result of an endogenous decision of rational agents.
4.2 Dynamics
The description of the equilibrium is now complete for a given set of prior
distributions. Nevertheless, priors and the process of their formation have not
been speci￿ed. Unfortunately, economic theory remains silent on the issue of
the origin of priors. Therefore, there is no natural benchmark to turn to. The
paper takes a subjective approach and assumes that priors are formed on the
3Observe that the aggregate investment can be used for perfect identi￿cation of variable
xt+1 and hence economic agents by observing the level of investment kt+1 can learn the true
value of xt+1. Naturally, if agents learn the true value of xt+1 then they can use it in the
process of expectation formation and they would behave as if they had perfect foresight ability.
This shortcoming can be addressed in either of the two ways. First of all, it can be assumed
that information on aggregate variables arrives with a lag and hence kt+1 cannot be used
for identi￿cation of xt+1. Alternatively, it could be assumed that agent i receives a fraction
ωi of economy wide pro￿ts where
)
ωidi =1and ωi is unknown and random. Then ωixt+1
becomes the relevant variable and expectations must be formed with regard to ωixt+1 rather
than xt+1 and then the overall level of investment stops being fully informative. The paper
does not follow this alternative approach in order not to expand the dimensionality of the
model.
18basis of past experience. Speci￿cally, it is assumed that economic agents observe
data up to T periods into the past and based on these observations design a
predictor. Then they use the predictor on past data and calculate prediction
errors. Finally priors are formed from the predictor and the prediction errors.
Observe that in systems that converge to an equilibrium currently observed
values become, by de￿nition, with time better and better predictors of future
variables. Therefore, it is natural to start with priors formed from a very simple
predictor that approximates future value with currently observed values. In par-
ticular, this simple predictor approximates the value of xt+1 with xt. Therefore,
the expected value of xt+1 is simply equal to xt, i.e., Etxt+1 = xt.T h ev a r i a n c e
is equal to the variance of errors, εt−i = xt−i+1−xt−i,m a d eb yt h ep r e d i c t o ro n
past data. Under these assumptions of priors formation the dynamic equation














as Etxt+1 = xt. The optimal quality of signal satis￿es (31). Dynamic properties
depend on the magnitude of ψ.I fψ is smaller than 1 in absolute value then the
level of capital stock and xt converge to an equilibrium, whereas if ψ is greater
than 1 in absolute value then the level of capital stock and xt follow explosive
paths. The paper analyses the two cases in turn.
Case 1 Let the parameters of the model be such that
ψ < 1. (34)
In this case x and consequently the level of capital stock follow a path that
converges to an equilibrium irrespective of a given choice of q2
t.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
even if agents choose, along the equilibrium path, not to learn and form ex-
pectations in an adaptive manner the economy converges to an equilibrium.
Moreover, convergence implies by de￿nition that with time the distance be-
tween xt+1 and xt approaches zero, i.e., εt−i → 0 and σ2
xt+1 → 0. This means
that as time progresses it pays more and more to form expectations in an adap-
tive manner, i.e., q2
t → 0 as t →∞ . Therefore, as long as condition (34) is met
x and consequently the level of capital stock converge to an equilibrium and the
economy is stable in the long run. The long run level of capital stock and the











∗ = k∗. Figure (3) depicts the evolution of the level of output in an
economy when condition (34) is met.
It is clear that in this case the economy settles into a steady state in the
long run and only exogenous shocks can cause ￿uctuations in macroeconomic



















The Evolution of Output when  ψ <1.
Figure 3: The Evolution of Output when ψ < 1.
variables. The situation is diﬀerent when condition (34) is violated. This case
is dealt with next.
Case 2 Assume that the parameters of the model satisfy the following inequality
ψ > 1, (35)
i.e., assume that whenever agents choose to form expectations in an adaptive
manner the level of capital stock, and hence the marginal propensity to save,
follow an explosive path.4
Condition (35) implies that at any time the economy can be in either of two
regimes. For q2
t suﬃciently close to one it follows a process that converges to an
equilibrium, i.e., the economy could be in a convergence regime. On the other
hand for q2
t suﬃciently close to zero the economy follows a process that does not
converge to an equilibrium, i.e., the economy is in a divergence regime. Figure
(4) illustrates sample dynamics in the two regimes.
In general, the economy could be in either of the two regimes depending
on the precise value of q2
t.R e c a l l t h a t q2
t does not constitute a parameter of
the economy, but it depends on actions taken by economic agents and is itself
determined as an equilibrium outcome. In particular, if economic agents choose
q2
t to be large enough then the economy will follow a convergent path, on the
other hand, if they choose q2
t to be small then the economy will proceed on a
divergent path.
4Assumption of case 2 can be derived rather than imposed in a model in which optimization
costs accrue in the form of forgone pro￿ts rather than in the form of utility costs.






























Figure 4: The Evolution of Physical Capital in Convergence and Divergence
Regimes.
It is relatively straight forward to establish that as long as ψ > 1 the economy
does not settle down into a steady state. The reasoning is simple and assumes
￿rst the opposite. If the economy were to settle into a steady state then at
some point the predictor would become relatively eﬃcient and errors made with
the predictor and their variance would be arbitrarily close to zero. Therefore,
learning would become suboptimal and the quality of signal chosen would be
eventually zero, i.e., q2
t =0 .H o w e v e r , w i t h q2
t set to zero xt would follow a
divergent path and no rest point would be attained. Hence a contradiction. It
remains to establish that dynamic variables will not grow or keep diminishing
for ever, i.e., it needs to be shown that the lack of a steady state implies equilib-
rium oscillations. In economic terms variable xt+1 cannot grow for ever for its
growth requires on one hand high investment as xt+1 =2 ψkt+1,i.e., future prof-
its are increasing in the productive capacity of the economy, and on the other
hand discourages investment as indicated by equation (32) high expected future
income leads to small savings. Similar argument applies to the case when xt+1
where to keep falling. Technically, the eigenvalue in the system (??)i sn e g a t i v e
hence the path the economy follows must be oscillatory.
In general the dynamic properties of the process followed by xt depend on the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient preceding xt.F o rq2
t suﬃciently high the coeﬃcient
is necessarily less than one and xt converges to an equilibrium. On the other
hand if q2
t i sc l o s et oz e r ot h e nt h ec o e ﬃcient is higher than one and xt does not
converge to an equilibrium. Therefore, depending on the magnitude of q2
t the
economy follows either a divergent or a convergent path. Naturally, q2
t is chosen
in equilibrium and the equilibrium choice determines the characteristics of the
underlying equilibrium process. Observe that whenever the economy follows a












The Evolution of Output and the Precision of Signals in Time when ψ >1









Figure 5: The Evolution of Output and the Precision of Signal in Time when
ψ > 1.
divergent path errors made with the naive predictor become large and their vari-
ance becomes high, i.e., the predictor becomes less and less reliable. Economic
agents fearing sizable losses due to suboptimal behavior along the intertemporal
margin decide to learn and purchase informative signals, i.e., they, as equation
31 indicates, increase the value of q2
t. This, however, changes the nature of the
dynamic process of xt. Speci￿cally, xt is put on a convergent path. Therefore,
errors made with the naive predictor become smaller. Expectations based on
the naive predictor do not lead to serious ineﬃciencies along the intertemporal
margin and allow to save on the information gathering and processing costs.
Consequently economic agents turn towards the naive predictor and stop learn-
ing. However, as a result the nature of the dynamic process is changed again
and the economy enters a divergence regime. This leads to a loss of accuracy
of the naive predictor and learning starts again. The process continues and the
economy permanently oscillates between convergence and divergence regimes
and never settles into a steady state. Figure (5) presents sample dynamics.
The paper up to this point has in eﬀect limited the set of feasible expec-
tation formation technologies to convex combinations of perfect foresight ex-
pectation and a naive expectation. Speci￿cally, priors have been assumed to
be formed with a very simple predictor. However, the assumption may be too
restrictive. It is reasonable to assume that learning, simple trend and pattern
extraction, based on past realized data does not involve signi￿cant costs. The
paper, therefore, relaxes the previous restriction and permits economic agents
to select expectation formation technologies from a richer set.
Speci￿cally, it is assumed that economic agents can freely process informa-
22tion up to T periods into the past. Analysis of past data allows economic agents
to identify predictors. These predictors are in turn used to design priors. Priors
are obtained by applying predictors to past data and assuming that true errors
are distributed according to the distribution formed by residuals. For notational





























be a predictor of x
 


























where a(i)=a(1)ωi−1 for i ∈ {2,...,K}, ωis a constant and the weights sum






t−j−i+1,j∈ {1,..,T − K}
be the errors obtained on past data with the predictor. The prior is formed
using the predictor of x
 
t+1 and assuming that potential errors are distributed
according to the distribution of the residuals. Under these assumption the
evolution of variable x
 
















where the quality of signals q2
t is given by equation (31.)
As shown by Chiarella and He [11] the dynamic properties of equation (37)
depend on the magnitude of the coeﬃcients. Speci￿cally a suﬃcient condition


















Observe that were convergence to occur then the quality of signals would be
eventually arbitrarily close to zero and the above condition would simplify to
2ψa(1) > 1+ψ. Moreover, for ω small enough the condition is necessarily
satis￿ed. Therefore, convergence cannot occur. The ￿gure (6) presents sample
dynamics when economic agents form expectations according to (36).
5Note that the predictor can be biased. If this were the case it would be natural to modify
the predictor with the bias 1
T−KΣT−K
j=1 εt+j−1. Note, however, that if convergence were to
occur the bias would be arbitrarily close to zero, hence, it would become negligible and its
presence would not change the results.















The Evolution of Output and the Precision of Signals in Time when 2 ψ a(1)>1+ ψ












Figure 6: The Evolution of Output when 2ψa(1) > 1+ψ.
In summary, the economy does not settle into a steady state. The path
it follows is oscillatory and is chosen in equilibrium. Speci￿cally, the form of
expectation formation is the key determinant of the path. The quality of sig-
nals purchased determines the size of the intertemporal errors. Moreover, it
de￿nes the characteristic of the underlying equilibrium dynamic equation (33).
If agents choose to be relatively well informed, qt close to one, then the coeﬃ-
cient in front of Etx
 
t+1 is less than one. This implies that the economy follows
a convergent, albeit oscillatory, path, which terminates in a stable, given a high
choice of qt, steady state. However, if complete convergence were to occur priors
w o u l db e c o m em o r ei n f o r m a t i v e .S p e c i ￿cally past realized values would have to
be close to the true realized value and the variance would become arbitrarily
small. Moreover, the quality of signals depends on the variance of the underlying
prior. Therefore, economic agents would stop learning as the priors would be
suﬃcient to predict the future nearly with certainty and learning is costly. This,
however, would change the nature of the law of motion of variable x
 
.F o r qt
low enough, when there is no learning, the law of motion describes an explosive
path. Therefore, convergence would lead economic agents to choose not to learn,
but that would push the economy out of the convergence regime and would put
it on an explosive path into a divergence regime. This would, however, ruin
the informativeness of priors, their variance would increase, and would again
make agents learn. However, learning would again lead to convergence and the
cycle would repeat itself inde￿nitely. In equilibrium the economy bounces back
and forth between two regimes. Economic agents either learn and this leads
to convergence or rely on past observations and this leads to divergence. In
equilibrium, the two regimes alternate.
244.3 Inferences from Past Data
Rational expectations approach to modelling decision making under uncertainty
de￿nes a benchmark in economic theory. In a very minimalist sense the rational
expectations approach assumes that economic agents use the true distributions
functions of the underlying variables in the decision making process. Conse-
quently, the approach assumes that economic agents know the ￿model,￿ i.e., are
aware of the structure of the economy they operate in. The intuitive justi￿cation
for the assumption invokes the law of large numbers, which allows to identify
the relevant distribution functions and the interdependence between economic
variables.
Economic literature normally imposes exogenous uncertainty on determin-
istic models. Such an approach is consistent with the assumption of rational
expectations. Indeed, time evolving uncertainty resolution should eventually
identify the true distribution functions as these are not aﬀected by behavior
of economic agents. In other words, even if economic agents at some point use
incorrect distributions functions they are eventually able to identify the frequen-
cies of all states of nature as these are not aﬀected by their actions based on
incorrect distributions. Consequently, economic literature nearly never focuses
on the approach path towards a given rational expectations equilibrium, i.e.,
nearly universally starts by assuming that learning, if any, must have already
occurred. Naturally, the route followed by the literature is sound and consistent,
however, it does not comprise all possibilities.
In the model of this paper there are no stochastic disturbances at all. All vari-
ables are generated by deterministic processes. Therefore, the issue of economic
agents knowing the true distribution functions becomes super￿uous. However,
it still remains to be veri￿ed whether it is reasonable to assume that economic
agents know the ￿model.￿






Naturally, the true realized value of x
 
t+1 depends on expectations formed at time
t with regard to variable x
 
t+1. Therefore, the realized outcome in period t +1
depends on actions taken by economic agents at time t.T h i sd i ﬀers the model of
this paper from the benchmark normally present in the literature. The diﬀerence
aﬀects in a profound manner the learning process. In the current context errors
aﬀect the realized values whereas in the main stream of the literature they do
not. Therefore, economic agents in the learning process must take into account
t h ef a c tt h a tt h e i rm i s t a k e sa ﬀect equilibrium outcomes.
In a special case when economic agents form expectations given a prior Fx
 
t+1
formed from a naive predictor and a signal of quality q2















t large enough it is a convergent process. Naturally, data generated by
25the above process allow for a perfect identi￿cation of all relevant coeﬃcients,
i.e., allow economic agents to learn the model. However, the shape of the model
depends on the speci￿c form of the expectation formation technology. Therefore,
if economic agents were to use their knowledge of the model in the process of
expectation formation they would change the nature of the model. Speci￿cally,
if economic agents were to start forming expectations according to the true














i.e., the process would change. Naturally, the new process is also perfectly
identi￿able from data, however, an attempt to use the new model for assessments
of x
 
t+1 would change the model again. In general after i steps of learning of













Not only the process would be diﬀerent from all previous processes, but also for
i large enough the coeﬃcient in front of x
 
t must be necessarily greater than one.
Therefore, the process of learning not only fails to identify a rule that would
allow economic agents to form expectations correctly, but also destabilizes the
economy. Note that the initial process led to a steady state whereas the process
obtained after i stages of learning does not.
The above example illustrates that while past data can be used for identi￿-
cation of analytic relationships the relationships need not have practical impor-
tance as an attempt to use a relationship changes the nature of the relationship
and invalidates the original relationship. The model, thus, provides a version of
the Lucas Critique [31] in the context of expectation formation and its impact
on the coeﬃcients of the underlying model.
5 Policy Considerations
Professional economists while considering high frequency ￿uctuations in macro-
economic variables to be a matter of fact diﬀer as to their signi￿cance. Some
economists maintain that oscillations while present are either virtually harmless,
most notably Lucas [30], when one considers their impact on welfare or adhere
to the view that any attempts to counteract them must necessarily be welfare
worsening, RBC theory proponents. Therefore, they argue, governments should
restrain themselves from activists policies since, given the presence of lags and
uncertainty, any policy aimed at mitigating ￿uctuations is bound to cause more
harm than good. On the other hand there are plenty of arguments, most recent
those of Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido [19] and of Caballero and Hammour [8],
that note potential sizable costs of recessions, and at the minimum, advocate
caution in dealing with movements in macroeconomic variables. Furthermore,
26in practice governments almost always resort to active policies and rarely rely
on the approach of benign neglect. This paper, while not being equipped to
resolve fully the ongoing dispute, delivers several predictions and delivers clear
policy recommendations.
First of all note that there are imperfections introduced into the paper by
assumption. The assumption of imperfect competition in itself calls for an ac-
tive intervention. Similarly, the fact that an OLG model is used as a benchmark
allows for the possibility of dynamic ineﬃciency and makes potentially govern-
ment policy viable. The paper, however, takes these two imperfections as given
and does not attempt to provide prescriptions that could counteract them. The
paper shows that ￿uctuations in macroeconomic variables are costly and fo-
cuses only on measures that could limit the impact of equilibrium ￿uctuations
on welfare.
Observe that whenever the error of perception is positive economic agents are
overoptimistic. This overoptimism aﬀects the amount saved in equilibrium and
leads to intertemporal welfare redistribution. First of all overoptimism decreases
saving and increases current output and the welfare of current old. Moreover, it
is ex post costly to the currently young since they eventually ￿n do u tt h a tt h e y
were overly optimistic and that they under saved. Furthermore, it is costly to
the members of the future generations since they have too little capital to work
with. Similarly, overpessimism leads to intertemporal welfare shifts harming
currently alive and unnecessarily rewarding the future generations. Therefore,
inability to foresee the future perfectly leads to suboptimal outcomes and makes
government intervention viable.
Fluctuations in this paper are an outcome of aggregate demand disturbances.
The disturbances result from the fact economic agents revise, in an individu-
ally rational manner, their expectations. Speci￿cally, ￿uctuations are due to
the fact that economic agents willing to economize on information gathering
and processing costs choose not to foresee the future correctly. Naturally, a
very simple policy can restore the ￿r s tb e s to u t c o m e .T h eg o v e r n m e n ts h o u l d
gather and process information and should endow the public with the best pos-
sible estimates of the future economic variables. This simple strategy can fully
eliminate oscillations in the framework of this paper. In practice, however, this
strategy need not be a realistic option as the viability of the option stems from
the fact that the paper uses a representative agent framework. In general, in
an environment with heterogenous agents the government need not have the
capacity to estimate future income streams of all agents and the basic strategy
must be replaced with second best instruments.
Tax cuts and government spending remain the two major policy instruments.
Moreover, during recessions attempts to restore consumer con￿dence are a key
component of stabilization programs. Implicit for these policies is the assump-
tion that for some reason consumers choose not to spend the amount they ought
to. However, the assumption is inconsistent with the rational expectations par-
adigm. The framework of this paper allows to justify that these policies are
indeed welfare improving and consistent with consumer behavior. Fluctuations
arise because expectations held by economic agents are based on information
27sets being subject to normal decision making and as a result economic agents
can save either too little or too much as compared to the full information case.
The approach of counter cyclical de￿cits is the most natural instrument that can
in￿uence the level of savings and physical capital formation. The government
can eliminate cycles and increase welfare by running a de￿cit when economic
agents are overly pessimistic and maintaining a surplus when economic agents
undersave. In general, a bond issue, or purchases of physical capital, in the
amount of
bt = ∆kt = kt − k
PF
t (39)
restores the full information equilibrium. Again this assumes that the govern-
ment is fully aware of the price value of kPF
t , which is seldom the case in practice
and, thus makes the policy ineﬀective. Nevertheless, any form of an automatic
stabilizer, such as a proportional tax, can limit the scope of ineﬃciencies re-
sulting from expectations revisions. Similarly, measures that boost consumer
con￿dence during recessions can be welfare improving as these increase the level
of consumer spending and bring the economy to the full information level of out-
put.
Output growth that exceeds the speed of expansion of the productive ca-
pacity of the economy eventually leads to an adjustment in the price level.
Therefore, movements of the price level can serve as signals for policy decisions.
Speci￿cally, policy makers routinely choose to follow restrictive policies when
price increases. Naturally, such a policy helps to bring the level of output to
its potential, however, it remains orthogonal to economic theory as departures
of output above or below its potential are not supported by the assumption of
rational decision making. The model developed in this paper not only shows
that counter cyclical policy indeed helps to restore the potential level of output,
b u ti ta l s oc o n ￿rms viability of the policy. The model exhibits standard demand
side disturbances properties. In particular, it captures a positive correlation be-
tween price and demand increases. Speci￿cally, several steps of algebra allow to
establish
(pt − ﬂ p)(yt − y)￿
$ﬂ β − βt
%2 , (40)
where variables with an upper bar denote the variables that would materialize
under perfect foresight. Clearly, a price that exceeds ﬂ p is indicative of output
exceeding the potential and calls for a restrictive policy action as not fully
informed agents overspend. On the other hand a price that is below ﬂ p signals a
s l u m pi nd e m a n da n dj u s t i ￿es an expansionary mode as economic agents hold
too pessimistic expectations. Therefore, policy makers can observe movements
in the price level and base their decisions on price level changes. The model
is, thus, consistent with practice normally observed in reality as it justi￿es a
restrictive policy move in the case of in￿ation.
Blanchard [4] argued that the 1990/91 recession was an outcome of a con-
sumption shock. The shock itself is left unexplained. However, a revision of
overly optimistic consumption plans is listed as a potential cause of the shock.
Naturally, the argument allows implicitly for the possibility of economic agents
being unable or choosing not to follow optimal consumption plans. Similarly,
28occasional dramatic buildups of consumer credit are thought to signal some
form of irrational behavior on the part of consumers. All these possibilities
are considered to lead to output growth that is not justi￿ed by corresponding
growth of the productive capacity of the economy. The discrepancy, if it exists,
is not sustainable and normally leads to active policy measures. Clearly, pol-
icy design invokes the concepts of overheating and output gap. Yet, economic
theory has not given any formal meaning to these terms. The framework of
this paper allows to de￿ne these concepts in a natural manner. Note that the
optimal amount invested at time t diﬀers from the amount actually invested.
The diﬀerence, given by,
kPF




t)(Etxt+1 − xt+1) (41)
accounts for consumer overcon￿dence. When the above quantity is positive
consumers save too little and the economy departs from its trend upwards and
operates above its potential. In such a situation the economy can be thought as
being overheated as the temporary spending boost cannot be sustained. More-
over, when the actual level of investment matches the level of investment under
perfect foresight then the level of output can be thought as being equal to its
potential. Revision of expectations either upwards or downwards lead to ei-
ther an upward or a downward deviation of output. These deviations allow
actual output to diﬀer from potential output. The diﬀerence can be naturally
interpreted as a measure of output gap.
In general the model allows to de￿ne several measures of output. First of all,
the model de￿nes the equilibrium level of output. The level is determined by the
supply side characteristics and by expectations, which in￿uence the composition
of aggregate demand. In addition, there are other concepts. Speci￿cally, the
model de￿nes the level of output that would materialize if agents always formed
expectations using the best available expectation formation technology. The
level can be interpreted as the natural level of output or the potential level of
output. Moreover, the level of output that would exist under the assumption
of perfect foresight need not be, and typically is not, identical with the average
level of output. Finally, there is a level of output that would materialize if
economic agents chose to form expectations in a perfect foresight manner at
a given point in time rather than the way they actually chose to. Note that,
this measure is not the same as the level of output generated by an economy
in which all agents form expectations using perfect foresight technology at all
points in time. This is due to the fact that any change in expectations not only
changes the level of consumption, but also the level of investment. Figures (7)
and (8) present samples of measures.
In summary, expansions and recessions exist because consumers￿ expecta-
tions are either overly pessimistic or overly optimistic. Overoptimism leads to
low savings and to a higher level of output than the potential level of output,
while overpessimism leads to high savings and to a level of output below the
potential level of output. The deviations of output from the potential level of
output lead to intertemporal welfare redistribution. Therefore, countercyclical
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Figure 7: The Evolution of Output, Potential Output, and Output with Capital
Stock Held Fixed in Time.
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Figure 8: The Evolution of Output, Output under Perfect Foresight with Time
Varying Capital Stock, and the Average Level of Output.
30policy leading to smoothing of deviations of output from long run trend can
limit welfare losses.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper recognizes that expectations and the process of expectation forma-
tion are not, in principle, imposed on the economy, but rather that they are
subject to the discretion of economic agents and are determined as a part of
equilibrium. Consequently, the paper develops a framework in which agents at
any point in time decide in an individually rational manner what expectations
to hold. Expectations are derived from speci￿c expectation formation technolo-
gies and are chosen on the basis of the level of utility they are expected to yield.
The set of feasible expectation formation technologies comprises both a perfect
foresight technology and "naive," based on past experience, expectation forma-
tion technologies. The perfect foresight technology allows for optimal savings
decision whereas the "naive" expectation formation technologies need not suf-
￿ce to guarantee eﬃciency along the intertemporal margin. The choice of an
expectation formation technology is not trivial as the paper assumes that expec-
tation formation is costly. Speci￿cally, the more accurate a given expectation
formation technology is the higher its costs. Therefore, economic agents willing
to attain eﬃciency along the intertemporal margin must pay a high expectation
formation cost on the other hand those who choose to rely on past experience
face the risk of suboptimal saving behavior, but save on information gathering
and processing costs. Agents weigh the two costs and make informed decisions
with the regard to the type of expectations they wish to hold.
While the assumption of Agents￿ discretion over expectations adds on to real-
ism it also carries non trivial implications. The paper develops a model in which
the economy follows an unstable dynamic equation when all agents choose to
form expectations in an adaptive manner and follows a dynamic equation that
settles into a rest point if economic agents choose to form expectations in a
perfect foresight manner. This basic structure, as noted by Brock and Hommes
[7], leads in a natural manner to endogenous ￿uctuations in macroeconomic
variables. Speci￿cally, the paper establishes that rational choice over expecta-
tions can lead to endogenous ￿uctuations in aggregate demand. Optimization
over expectations makes agents alternate between better and worse expectation
formation technologies depending on the distance from a potential rest point.
T h ec l o s e rt h ee c o n o m yi st oap o t e n t i a lr e s tp o i n tt h em o r ec u r r e n to u t c o m e s
resemble future outcomes. Therefore, expectations based on naive expectation
formation technologies allow for nearly optimal behavior along the intertempo-
ral margin and at the same time do not involve any information gathering and
processing costs. Naturally, rational agents on the approach path, where the
economy is suﬃciently stable, to a potential rest point choose to rely on coarser
expectation formation technologies and eventually turn towards naive expecta-
tions. However, if all agents choose to form expectations in an adaptive manner
the economy enters an unstable path and errors of perception become larger and
31larger. Eventually, economic agents must turn towards more robust expectation
formation technologies as the loss in terms of utility resulting from large errors
of perception outweighs information gathering and processing costs. However,
this puts the economy on a convergent path and again the economy approaches
a potential rest point. When the economy is suﬃciently close to a rest point
agents turn again towards adaptive expectation formation and the cycle repeats
itself. As a consequence the economy oscillates between two distinctive regimes:
a convergence and a divergence regime. Whenever, the economy is in the con-
vergence regime agents form expectations in an adaptive manner this, however,
pushes the economy into the divergence regime. Moreover, in the divergence
regime agents form expectations in a nearly perfect foresight manner. This,
however, introduces stability and pushes the economy back into the conver-
gence regime. The cycle repeats itself and results in permanent and endogenous
￿uctuations in aggregate variables.
The paper is written is an explicit macroeconomic context. Speci￿cally, the
paper develops a general equilibrium model that comprises the Diamond [14]
OLG model, the Blanchard and Kiyotaki [5] monopolistic competition para-
digm, and the Brock and Hommes [7] framework of expectation selection as the
three key ingredients. In the model the presence of monopolistic competition
allows the composition of aggregate demand to aﬀect aggregate variables, i.e.,
the model exhibits multiplier characteristics. In particular, the higher the frac-
tion of income saved the lower the output and vice versa. In the context of the
paper economic agents form assessments of their future income streams. An ex-
pectation of favorable conditions in the future leads through the intertemporal
smoothing channel to low savings and in turn, through the multiplier eﬀect, to
high output, while an expectation of low future income increases savings and
leads through the multiplier eﬀect to low output today. Expectations, however,
are not assumed to be exogenous. Quite the opposite the process of expecta-
tion formation is a part of the equilibrium and any shifts in expectations are
equilibrium outcomes.
Moreover, the paper shows that the fact that expectations need not settle on
as p e c i ￿c value even in the long run can be deeply rooted in economic properties
of macroeconomic systems. Observe that equilibrium outcomes depend in part
on the amount of resources available. In particular, future income depends
on the future capital stock. Speci￿cally, a higher level of capital stock implies,
other things equal, a higher level of income. Furthermore, a high level of income
in the future implies, ceteris paribus, low savings at the present. However,
savings determine future capital stock. Therefore, low savings result in low
capital stock and hence in a low income in the future. This basic mechanism
illustrates that expectations of economic agents expecting favorable conditions
in the future and saving little must necessarily be invalidated when the future
actually arrives. The paper shows that if the ex post discrepancy is large enough
then the existence of this basic natural negative feedback mechanism can lead
to endogenous ￿uctuations in aggregate demand.
In addition, the paper delivers several predictions with the respect to pol-
icy prescriptions. It shows that the movements in aggregate output obtained
32within the framework of this paper constitute deviations from a long run trend
and argues that government intervention can be welfare improving. Moreover,
the paper quanti￿es the intangible notions of overheating, overborrowing, and
output gap.
In summary, the paper gives an example of an equilibrium route towards
endogenous ￿uctuations in aggregate demand. The ￿uctuations are the result
of equilibrium actions taken by rational utility maximizing agents.
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